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Newshounds know
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b y  r o b e r t  l o o n e y
that Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s fabu-
lously rich, democratically chosen prime minister, was deposed by the military in 
2006. What they probably don’t know is that Thaksin led an effort to defi ne a softer 
approach to economic development — 
one that acknowledged the central role of 
export expansion and open markets in 
generating growth, but attempted to pro-
tect those left behind in the rush to serve 
international markets. 
Nor are they likely to know that the fate 
of Thaksin (as well as Thaksinomics) may 
say important things about the limits of un-
orthodox economic policies in the teeth of 
globalization.
But I get ahead of myself. In many ways, 
Thaksin’s meteoric career refl ects the fortunes 
of Thailand in the last 30 years. Descended 
from 19th-century Chinese immigrants, Thak-
sin was the son of a silk merchant from the 
northern provincial capital of Chiang Mai. 
His career path, like those of many of his gen-
eration, began in public employment – in his 
case, as a police offi cer. Soon, however, the 
lure of the country’s expanding private sector 
proved too attractive to resist: In less than a 
decade, Thaksin built a business empire 
around communications and information 
technology. And in 2001, he made the Forbes 
list of the world’s richest people, with a for-
tune estimated at $1.2 billion. That same year, 
he was elected prime minister.
Thaksin’s governing style was unique for 
his time and region. In his mind, he was Thai-










As this article went to press, a political party favoring the return of Thaksin Shinawatra to power 
won a plurality of the votes in Thailand’s parliamentary elections. It is not yet clear whether the mili-
tary will allow Thaksin back into the country. But the election does suggest that the rural poor still 
see him as their best hope for change.  — the editors
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country’s growth rate while alleviating chronic 
rural poverty. Despite strenuous objections 
from the bureaucracy, he restructured the in-
stitutions of government through privatiza-
tion, decentralization of power, accountability 
and strict fi scal discipline.
At fi rst, everything came up roses. Thaksin 
was lauded for his entrepreneurial fl air, and 
foreign investors in particular saw him as a 
catalyst for constructive change at a time 
when Thailand appeared to be losing direc-
tion. His economic policies promised to re-
duce reliance on export growth by spurring 
domestic demand, especially in the least-de-
veloped parts of the country. “Thaksin’s name 
carried a hefty investment premium,” remem-
bers one prominent international investment 
banker. “He had new ideas and a new para-
digm for growth.” 
But what a difference a few years can 
make. On Sept. 19, 2006, Thaksin’s govern-
ment was deposed in a bloodless coup. And to 
the surprise of most outsiders, the coup had 
popular support (at least in urban areas), as 
well as tacit support from the country’s king. 
On hearing the news, thousands of Thais 
headed for the streets, calling for Thaksin’s 
head. And while Thaksin’s ouster was trig-
gered by a mix of factors, there is no doubt 
that the perceived failure of his economic 
polices played a central role. 
riches to rags 
Like the other Asian Tigers, Thailand’s growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s was guided by what is 
often called the East Asian economic model, 
which was built on a foundation of rising in-
dustrial productivity stemming mainly from 
direct injections of foreign capital and tech-
nology, as well as for the care and feeding of 
labor-intensive manufactured exports. Multi-
national corporations have often played a 
t r e n d s
7First Quarter  2008 
8 The Milken Institute Review
dominant role in both, building factories to 
manufacture apparel, shoes, toys, consumer 
electronics and the like for foreign markets. 
Until the summer of 1997, this strategy 
seemed to promise Thailand a secure spot 
among the Asian growth leaders – a promise 
implying that urban residents would eventu-
ally enjoy the living standards of South Kore-
ans, Singaporeans and Taiwanese. 
But in July 1997, a real estate bubble that 
had sucked in enormous amounts of “hot 
money” from abroad burst, revealing the fra-
gility of the banking system and forcing a 
sharp depreciation of the Thai baht as foreign 
capital beat a hasty retreat. To restore fi nan-
cial order, the Thai government agreed to a 
variety of conditions imposed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund in return for massive 
hard-currency loans.
The IMF’s approach to the meltdown 
leaned on the received wisdom of the so-
called Washington Consensus approach to 
development, which emphasized a mix of 
regulation to increase the transparency and 
stability of the banking system, corporate- 
governance reforms to inhibit crony capital-
ism, and strict adherence to balanced budgets 
and anti-infl ationary monetary policies. But 
this package of neo-liberal fi xes failed to 
jump-start the Thai economy. Indeed, it 
seemed to exacerbate a recession brought on 
by the decline of investment and the crisis of 
confi dence in the banking system. 
With the banks largely out of the business 
of lending money, most enterprises lost access 
to capital. Popular anger at the government 
rose as wages declined and income inequality 
widened. 
One consequence was the dazzling rise of 
the Tai Rak Thai (translation: Thais love 
Thais) Party, led by Thaksin. The TRT offered 
all things to all people, with a platform prom-
ising credit to hard-hit businesses, subsidies 
to alleviate the suffering of the (largely rural) 
poor – and, more generally, a rejection of the 
austerity imposed by the IMF. 
thaksinomics defined
Cutting to the chase, Thaksinomics combined 
the venerable East Asian export model’s em-
phasis on mass manufacturing spearheaded 
by foreign direct investment (dubbed the 
First Track) with initiatives to stimulate small-
er businesses that leveraged indigenous skills 
and resources (the Second Track). There was 
no sense in throwing out the tried and true, 
Thaksin reasoned: export-led growth worked. 
But the practical way to protect an export-led 
economy from external shocks – anything 
from a SARS-like epidemic to a recession in 
the United States – was to buffer the econo-
my’s dependence on foreign markets and for-
eign capital.
Thaksin’s First Track amounted to an affi r-
mation of the ongoing need to attract foreign 
capital, technology and managerial skills. The 
Second Track, however, focused on support-
ing enterprises that could shift Thailand away 
from direct competition with China in labor-
intensive products along with insulating local 
demand from external shocks. The goal was 
to reduce exports as a proportion of GDP from 
Thaksinomics’ first 
priority was alleviating 
poverty, especially in 
rural areas — and in the 
process cementing the 
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60 percent to 50 percent, and to increase the 
domestic demand for local products and ser-
vices from 55 percent of GDP to 60 percent – 
all without alienating foreign investors. 
getting from here to there
Thaksinomics’ highest priority was alleviat-
ing poverty, especially in rural areas – and in 
the process cementing the loyalty of the Tai 
Rak Thai Party’s political base. The govern-
ment decreed a three-year moratorium on 
farmers’ debt payments to the Bank for Agri-
culture and Agricultural Cooperatives as an 
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structure and loan-maturity profi le to match 
the crop-production cycle. At the same time, 
Bangkok launched a program to clarify land 
titles, so property could be used more readily 
as bank collateral. The urban poor were not 
entirely neglected: small loans were made 
available to ubiquitous street-side vendors 
through the Government Savings Bank. 
To create demand for large-ticket items 
like houses (and to shore up support from an-
other key constituency), the government 
granted civil servants a family death benefi t 
equivalent to 30 times their salaries. What 
gave this proposal some immediate fi scal kick 
was a provision permitting retirees to spend 
half of this sum before their deaths. The total 
amount of spending power created by this 
plan was estimated at 45 billion baht (then 
worth about $1.1 billion) – small change, per-
haps, in an economy with a GDP on the order 
of $150 billion, but money nicely targeted to 
boost consumption in the near term. 
To improve grass-roots access to credit, the 
Thaksin administration also created a num-
ber of new institutions. One of them, the Vil-
lage and Urban Revolving Fund, aimed at 
stimulating the rural economy. While it ful-
fi lled Thaksin’s fl ashy election campaign 
pledge to provide a one-million-baht 
($24,000) kitty to each of Thailand’s 70,000 
villages, the fund was not simply a populist 
handout. Rather, village leaders and bankers 
were asked to identify promising develop-
ment projects and to provide loans at 4 per-
cent interest (compared to commercial farm 
loans, at 5 to 8 percent). The idea was to en-
able farmers to increase productivity by 
branching into related activities like food 
processing. Households and groups could 
also draw on their local funds to start small 
businesses.
This latter mission was supplemented by 
the People’s Bank, set up to provide credit to 
micro-enterprises. In addition to fi nancing 
tiny investments for those lacking access to 
the formal banking system, the People’s Bank 
aimed at promoting entrepreneurship among 
poor and traditional small-village producers.
Thaksin’s Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Bank (SME Bank) provided 
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of micro-enterprises. Small and medium-size 
enterprises played a critical role in Thaksin’s 
plans for ongoing economic development, 
and for good reason. They accounted for 40 
to 50 percent of Thailand’s GDP, 38 percent 
of the total value of exports, and 69 percent of 
the country’s employment. Note that the em-
phasis on small and medium-size enterprises 
fi t neatly into Thaksinomics because of their 
potential to adjust to rapidly changing condi-
tions and to reduce reliance on unreliable 
global markets. 
Finally, the One Tambon, One Product 
project was based on an idea that had been a 
big hit in Japan. It was predicated on the idea 
that Thai tambons (sub-districts above the 
village level) should showcase specialized 
local products – apparel, jewelry, foods, even 
crafts – fi t for a much larger market. The 
project, which covered nearly all of Thai-
land’s 7,252 tambons, helped communities to 
identify such products in order to modernize 
their manufacturing and to distribute them 
in national (and even international) markets. 
As with the SME Bank, the goal was to fi nd al-
ternatives to the mass-produced products 
from big factories that were inevitably losing 
ground to their counterparts in China, Viet-
nam and Indonesia, which had the advantage 
of cheaper labor.
While these programs raised eyebrows 
among the Thai economic elites, they seem to 
have been effective in helping to halt post-
meltdown asset defl ation and in reviving do-
mestic demand. 
Running parallel to programs designed to 
diversify the Thai economy away from mass-
produced exports and toward smaller-scale 
production in the countryside was the Capital 
Creation Scheme, which aimed to spell out 
legal rights to property so that it could be 
used to collateralize market-rate commercial 
bank loans. The program had an ambitious 
agenda, including the reclassifi cation of land, 
intellectual property and even the vested in-
formal rights to sell food and other goods at 
specifi c street locations. Like many of Thaksin’s 
projects, it was inspired by foreigners – in this 
case the Peruvian economist Hernando de 
Soto, who argued that many poor countries’ 
woes could be traced to the inability of small 
The One Tambon, One Product project was predicated 
on the idea that Thai tambons should showcase spe-













12 The Milken Institute Review
businesses to join the visible economy. By one 
estimate, the Capital Creation Scheme had 
the potential to resurrect at least $10 billion 
worth of “dead” capital, transferring $10-$15 
billion worth of underground economic ac-
tivities into the formal economy.
It’s worth noting, too, that Thaksinomics 
involved more than the democratization of 
capital. Thaksin’s wildly popular “30-baht” 
health plan offered health care to anyone not 
otherwise insured for a fl at co-payment of 30 
baht (less than $1) per visit. With the stroke 
of a pen in 2001, Thailand extended health 
insurance to all in a middle-income country 
in which 30 percent of the population had 
previously been on their own. 
what it did and did not do
Thaksinomics is easier to defi ne in terms of 
what it was not. It defi nitely was not just op-
portunistic populism by another name, as 
critics have labeled it. And it was certainly not 
the sort of ideologically-inspired economic 
populism practiced by Alan Garcia in Peru in 
the 1980s or currently by Hugo Chavez in Ven-
ezuela. Nor did it resemble the “heterodox” 
wage-and-price-control approach to stagfl a-
tion that has been used to stimulate econo-
mies in a number of other countries in defi -
ance of the IMF. By the same token, it was 
non-confrontational, and, as such, did not 
mimic the anti-globalism in vogue in the last 
decade. 
On the theoretical level, Thaksinomics 
combined elements of demand management 
(Keynesianism), supply-side incentives (Rea-
ganomics), entrepreneurial development 
(Schumpeterism), grass-roots empowerment 
(de Sotoism) and the structuralist state-led 
growth advocated by the political economist 
Albert Hirschman. It embraced globalization 
and production based on the hoary concept 
of comparative advantage, while at the same 
time attempting to shape that advantage 
through government intervention. 
Thaksinomics is best viewed as a unique 
approach designed to meet the challenges to 
Thailand posed by globalization in general, 
China in particular and the disappointing re-
cord of the IMF in the wake of the Asian cur-
rency crisis. Clearly, it was a high-risk strate-
gy, taking advantage of post-crisis excess 
manufacturing capacity to manage a Keynes-
ian recovery without serious infl ation. But it 
was the failure of Thaksinomics to sustain 
high growth – and the high expectations as-
sociated with it – that proved its undoing.
Under Thaksin’s leadership, the Thai econ-
omy did quite nicely at fi rst, with real GDP 
growing at around 6 percent annually from 
2002 to 2004. While Thaksin and his follow-
ers attributed this surge to Thaksinomics, 
good luck also played a role: this period coin-
cided with both a strong upswing of the busi-
ness cycle in Thailand’s export markets and a 
new drive for regional economic integration 
built around the emerging China colossus. 
On the theoretical level, Thaksinomics combined 
elements of demand management, supply-side incen-
tives, entrepreneurial development, grass-roots 
empowerment and structuralist state-led growth. 
t r e n d s
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But by 2005, that tide was ebbing. Good 
luck turned to bad as the Thai economy was 
beset by the collapse of tourism after the In-
dian Ocean tsunami, the outbreak of bird fl u 
that gave investors pause, and rising violence 
as Muslim separatist insurgents challenged 
the army in the three southern border prov-
inces. In the midst of these events, rising world 
interest rates and higher oil prices dampened 
private investment and reduced consumption 
demand. The fi nal blow came when the gov-
ernment countered sagging growth with a 
large-scale infrastructure development plan 
costing the equivalent of $40 billion. This 
Keynesian blunderbuss added to infl ationary 
pressures by increasing the strain on skilled 
manpower without generating many jobs for 
Thaksin’s largely rural constituents.
Thaksin’s falling popularity throughout 
most of 2005 was not entirely due to sagging 
economic growth. The World Bank’s gover-
nance indicators confi rm the public’s general 
sense that Thaksin had failed to deliver the 
competent, no-nonsense leadership that he 
claimed as his mantle. In 2002, Thailand 
scored in the 60th percentile in “voice and ac-
countability” – a solid score for a country 
lacking a long history of democracy. Four 
years later, the fi gure had fallen to the 32nd 
percentile. And over the same period, the 
country’s score on the World’s Bank political 
stability scale fell from the 58th to the 16th 
percentile. 
This decline in the perceived openness of 
Thai democracy no doubt refl ected Thaksin’s 
CEO style. He never seemed to understand 
that, unlike a corporate head dealing with 
subordinates, he could not casually demand 
obedience from a free people. He brought se-
dition charges against critics, shut down op-
position news media and openly undermined 
the authority of Thailand’s judges. Civil ser-
vants who questioned his wisdom were fi red. 
What’s more, his heavy-handed attempts to 
stem the insurgency in the south further 
alienated democrats. 
Another catalyst for energizing opposition 
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In January 2006, Thaksin sold his family’s con-
trolling share in the Thai telecommunications 
giant, the Shin Corporation, to Singapore’s 
government-controlled investment company 
for $1.9 billion. While the transaction, which 
was structured to avoid all tax liability, was 
legal, it incited outrage. Many Thais believed 
that Thaksin was selling a vital national asset 
to a foreign government. And though the 
coup itself would not occur until later in the 
year, the handwriting was on the wall. 
post-thaksinomics
The generals who took over from Thaksin re-
placed his policies with an even more unorth-
odox strategy whose goal is to maximize 
“happiness” rather than growth. The blue-
print drew inspiration from the country’s 
highest moral authority: 70-year-old King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej. The king has long advo-
cated “suffi ciency” in Thai life, meaning hu-
mility, simplicity and living within one’s 
means – an approach at odds with both hell-
bent-for affl uence export-led growth and 
Thaksin’s effort to fi nd a third way that did 
not abandon the rural poor.
Thaksinomics offered the poor a shot at 
upward mobility through low-interest loans, 
low-cost medical care and programs that 
spurred farmyard capitalism – measures the 
coup leaders and the king now argue were un-
sustainable. Suffi ciency, by contrast, is less a 
policy than a strategy to minimize the risk of 
economic crises at the likely price of slower 
growth. This vaguely Buddhist approach to 
economics has left Thaksin’s supporters in 
rural Thailand to wonder if the boom days 
will ever return. 
As this article is being written in the fall of 
2007, the Thai economy seems to be moving 
sideways. It is still growing modestly, thanks 
to strong exports. But investment is down 
from 2006 and manufacturing demand is 
only absorbing about three-quarters of the 
sector’s productive capacity. Rising oil prices 
(which divert demand from domestic out-
put), a weakening dollar (which undermines 
Thailand’s competitiveness in the huge U.S. 
market) and the possibility of a recession in 
the United States could push Thailand into 
just the sort of economic failure that led 
Thais to elect Thaksin in 2001. 
Would the Thai economy have better pros-
pects today under a continuation of Thak-
sinomics? Certainly the rural poor would be 
better off. But for the foreseeable future, 
Thaksin’s talents will be directed toward very 
personal adventures – notably, overseeing the 
Manchester City professional football club of 
the English Premier League, which he owns.
A harder question to answer is whether the 
failings of Thaksinomics imply that softer de-
velopment models that include a lot of gov-
ernment intervention in the name of helping 
the poor cannot work in Asia. Thaksin cer-
tainly promised too much, raising popular 
expectations beyond what he could deliver. 
But China and India, Asia’s development gi-
ants, are now facing – and not facing up to – 
problems of coping with rural poverty in the 
midst of urban prosperity that Thaksin at-
tempted to address. 
Thaksinomics did not get it all right. But it 
is entirely possible that the failure to inter-
vene, Thaksin-style, to prevent growing in-
come inequality in Asia will sooner or later 
derail the continent’s rush to affl uence. 
Editor’s Note: Readers seeking more informa-
tion  about Thaksinomics may run across whole 
sentences on at least one Web site that are iden-
tical to the text above. A more technical draft of 
this article was posted on the Web some months 
ago and copied without acknowledgment or the 
author’s permission.  M
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